The Battle That Time Forgot: Cold War Counterintelligence and the Enigma of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission by Aden C. Magee

Author:Aden C. Magee [Magee, Aden C.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Russia & the Former Soviet Union, United States, Military, Political Science, History, Intelligence & Espionage
ISBN: 9781612009933
Google: fQ8AzgEACAAJ
Goodreads: 55876815
Publisher: Casemate
Published: 2021-06-30T00:00:00+00:00

They Knew All

Intelligence reporting is classified based on the sensitivity of the information (i.e., Confidential, Secret, Top Secret). Intelligence reporting is further compartmented for limited distribution based on the sensitivity of the source of the information (e.g., Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), Special Category (SPECAT), Limited Distribution (LIMDIS)). The more sensitive the source, the more highly classified and compartmentalized the information will be. The reason for the more stringent classification controls is that if the information is compromised, the intelligence agency receiving the information may be able to identify and neutralize the source based on the details of the compromised information. As such, reporting based on information from a well-placed mole or highly specialized technical collection capability will be much more highly controlled than information provided by a known, overt collection platform.

HUMINT collection reporting from USMLM was generally classified Confidential or Secret with no specific restrictions on distribution, which meant the USMLM reporting was very widely disseminated. Although there was still a “need-to-know” restriction, this was a relatively low threshold, and there was a broad appetite for any information involving Soviet military organization, equipment, and operations. Any element in the DoD, and particularly in USAREUR, responsible for collecting intelligence on or planning operations against the Soviet military, was a steady consumer of USMLM reporting. This was one reason why they were considered among the very most prolific sources of intelligence—because their intelligence reporting was among the most widely disseminated and consumed.

Another principle of intelligence is that information collected on an adversary is only completely valuable as long as that adversary does not know the information has been collected/compromised. When the adversary is made aware that information has been collected/compromised, the information becomes less valuable; and, if the information is damaging to the adversary, it will likely be rendered of no value over time due to actions taken to mitigate the damage/risks associated with the compromised information. Unfortunately, all of the intelligence that USMLM collected for at least the final two decades of the Cold War lost its value as it applied to this intelligence principle.

In contrast to the absolute void of insider-type information regarding SMLM-F, the Soviets (or their surrogates) had multiple sources who were known to have access to all USMLM reporting, and who were proven to have provided everything they had access to. Although the known spies are recognized for significantly more damaging compromises than USMLM intelligence and collection activities, the fact remains that they provided comprehensive information applicable to USMLM for at least a 20-year period from 1969–88.

Perhaps there were even more, but there were three known spies who had access to USMLM reporting who were known to have compromised all of the information they ever had access to. Therefore, unequivocally, the Soviets knew all.

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